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Introduction 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has increased housing instability and put millions of renters at risk of displacement 
since stay-at-home orders began in the US in March 2020. As non-essential businesses were closed to 
prevent the spread of the virus, an economic recession hit the country. Unemployment reached highs not 
seen since the Great Depression, with a 14.7% unemployment rate or 23 million unemployed Americans.1 
Resulting widespread household income loss left many Americans renters facing eviction. Federal, state, and 
local actors rushed to expand and adapt existing policies and create new ones to prevent the additional 
public health disaster that would result from millions of Americans becoming homeless in the midst of a 
contagious and deadly airborne disease. This paper examines two housing policy measures – eviction 
moratoriums and emergency rental assistance (ERA) – taken to prevent evictions during COVID-19, exploring 
these policies at the federal, state, and local level. The paper uses the state of North Carolina, specifically 
Orange County, as a case study, examining Orange County’s Emergency Housing Assistance (EHA) fund. 
Finally, this paper examines how the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the weaknesses of US affordable 
housing policy, and explores potential policy proposals for the future of housing in the US. 
Methodology & Definitions 
Information about eviction moratoria and emergency rental assistance funding were collected from federal 
and state legislative documents. Data on nationwide ERA programs and program evaluation was informed 
primarily by national housing policy research centers. North Carolina county-level eviction filing data was 
collected from the Carolina Tracker, a project out of the UNC Department of City and Regional Planning. This 
tool collected courts data on eviction case filings from 2016-2020. Data on the Orange County Emergency 
Housing Assistance fund was provided by the Orange County Housing and Community Development (HCD) 
department and covers 2020 only, aggregated by month. Qualitative data on the EHA fund was collected 
through primary sources publicly available on the Orange County website, and through three interviews with 
Orange County HCD staff Emila Sutton and Erika Brandt, conducted in July 2020, September 2020, and March 
2021, plus subsequent email exchanges. 
Due to the ongoing nature of the COVID-19 pandemic, data and legislation continue to be released 
throughout the development of this paper. Legislation details have been updated to reflect the most recent 
 




status as of April 1, 2021. Quantitative data regarding North Carolina eviction filings and the Orange County 
EHA are current to the end of 2020. 
The following federal legislation is addressed multiple times throughout this paper, and therefore defined 
below: 
The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act: A $2.2 trillion economic stimulus bill signed 
into law by President Donald Trump on March 27, 2020. This bill contained major relief policies including 
individual $1,200 stimulus checks, extra unemployment insurance payments of $600 per week, and the 
creation of Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans. Relevant to this paper, the CARES Act also allocated 
money for emergency rental assistance and contained the first federal eviction moratorium. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Eviction Moratorium: The CDC first issued an eviction 
moratorium on September 4, 2020; this move was unprecedented. The moratorium has been regularly 
modified and extended throughout 2020 and as recently as April, 2021. 
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021: A $2.3 trillion spending bill signed into law by President Donald 
Trump on December 27, 2020. In addition to approving a second round of stimulus checks for $600, this bill 
extended the CDC eviction moratorium and created the Emergency Rental Assistance (ERA) program which 
allocated $25 billion to state and local governments. 
The American Rescue Plan: A $1.9 trillion economic stimulus bill signed into law by President Joe Biden on 
March 11, 2021. This bill included a third individual stimulus check for $1400 and extra unemployment 
insurance payments of $300 per week. It also provided $21.6 billion in ERA funds. Because this bill was 
passed through budget reconciliation to avoid a filibuster, it could not include policy changes; therefore, an 
additional eviction moratorium was not included in this bill. 
Part 1: Housing Policies During COVID-19 
Eviction Moratoria 
Eviction moratoria have been implemented at multiple levels during COVID-19, forming a layered patchwork 
of policies with differing timelines, regulations, and applicability. These differences have created gaps in 
renter protections. This section provides a list of federal eviction moratoria and North Carolina state eviction 
moratoria. While some jurisdictions in the US also had eviction moratoria at the local level, Orange County 
was not one of them. Another eviction prevention method during COVID-19 has been writing eviction 
moratoria into local emergency rental assistance funds; this practice is discussed in the ERA section of this 
paper. 
Federal moratoria The first federal eviction moratorium was in the CARES Act. Section 4024 of the CARES Act 
included a non-payment eviction moratorium covering all properties that participated in federal assistance 
programs or were funded by a federally-backed mortgage loan. This included tenants with housing choice 
vouchers, tenants in Section 8 project-based properties, and tenants living in LIHTC properties. It also 
protected any tenants renting a house whose mortgage was owned by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, although 
it’s questionable whether renters would know how their landlords financed their house.2 Under the 
moratorium, landlords could also not charge late fees during the time period, although there were no rules 
about late fees accruing and being charged later. The CARES Act eviction regulations were weaker than 
 




legislators and tenant advocates had proposed – for example, H.R. 6379, the Workforce Emergency Response 
Act, was introduced to the House of Representatives in mid-March 2020 and included a full eviction 
moratorium for all renters for all reasons except serious criminal acts; this act did not pass.3 It’s estimated 
that the eviction protections in the CARES Act applied to 28% to 46% of rental units. The moratorium ended 
on July 24, 2020 and covered tenants could not be forced to vacate until 30 days after that.4 
The second federal eviction moratorium was issued by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) on September 4, 
2020 and has been extended multiple times since. This moratorium was preceded by an executive order by 
President Donald Trump on August 14, 2020 instructing the CDC to consider such a moratorium. The CDC has 
the authority to issue such an order under section 361 of the Public Health Service Act, which authorizes the 
Health and Human Services Secretary (delegating to the CDC Director) to take measures to prevent the entry 
and spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the US and between states and territories.5 
The CDC moratorium requires each adult listed on a lease to provide their landlord with a declaration proving 
their eligibility. Eligibility requirements for renters are: (1) They have used their best efforts to attain all 
available government assistance, (2) They expected to earn no more than $99,000 in 2020, or received a 
stimulus check, (3) They have had a substantial income loss, loss of hours, a lay-off, or out-of-pocket medical 
expenses that make them unable to pay rent, (4) They are using their best efforts to make partial rent 
payments, (5) Eviction would render them homeless. This declaration could be found online. The most recent 
iteration of this order modified this requirement so that any written document could be substituted for the 
official declaration as long as it contained the same information, and one declaration can include all tenants. 
The CDC moratorium does not supersede any state, local, territorial, or tribal moratorium that provides the 
same or greater levels of protection, nor does it prevent those jurisdictions from implementing additional 
requirements.  
There are several absent protections that would make such additional moratoria necessary. Importantly, 
under the CDC order, landlords are not required to make their tenants aware of the eviction moratorium or 
of the tenant eligibility requirements and declaration. The order also allows landlords to begin eviction 
proceedings as long as the actual removal of a tenant doesn’t take place.6 An eviction filing can show up on a 
tenant background check as public record, barring them from future housing opportunities. For these 
reasons, the CDC order has been widely criticized by housing advocates while also facing legal challenges by 
landlord groups. 
Both the CARES Act and the CDC moratoria apply only to eviction for reasons of nonpayment of rent and 
related fees; tenants can still be evicted for other causes. While the CARES Act moratorium prevented the 
accumulation of late fees or interest, the CDC moratorium allowed this practice to continue. Table 1 shows 







3 Workforce Emergency Response Act of 2020, H.R. 6379, 116th Cong. (March 2020). https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-
congress/house-bill/6379  
4 Federal Eviction Moratoriums in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic. (March 30,2021). Congressional Research Service. 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11516  
5 HHS/CDC Temporary Halt in Residential Evictions to Prevent the Further Spread of COVID-19 Frequently Asked Questions. 
(2020). CDC. https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/eviction-moratoria-order-faqs.pdf  
6 Ibid.  
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Table 1: Federal Eviction Moratoria 




CARES Act President 
Donald 
Trump 
Halts nonpayment evictions for renters 
in federally-funded properties 
March 27, 
2020 
Mar 27-July 24, 
2020  
(+30 days) 




Further Spread of 
COVID-19 
CDC 
Applies to all renters making less than 
$99,000. Renters must provide signed 
declaration of eligibility. 
September 
4, 2020 







Extends the CDC moratorium 
December 
27, 2020 
Dec 31, 2020-Jan 
31, 2021 




Further Spread of 
COVID-19 
CDC Further extends the CDC moratorium 
January 
29, 2021 
Jan 31-Mar 31, 
2021 




Further Spread of 
COVID-19 
CDC 
Further extends the CDC moratorium. 
Modifications: Renters do not need to 
submit a new declaration. The crime of 
“trespass” is not cause for eviction*. 
Renters who have been exposed to 
COVID-19 should not be evicted. 
Renters may use any written document 
in place of the Declaration. 
March 28, 
2021 
Apr 1-June 30, 
2021 
*Because eviction for criminal reasons is allowed, landlords may attempt to accuse a tenant of criminal trespass for staying in 
their unit without paying rent. This modification attempts to prevent that practice. 
 
State moratoria North Carolina has issued multiple eviction moratoria, starting with an order from the Chief 
Justice to halt eviction court proceedings. The first state executive order on eviction (EO 142) was issued 
three months before the CDC moratorium, meaning that while it was active it was the sole protection for 
renters who were either not covered by the CARES Act moratorium or who lost coverage when it expired. EO 
142 lasted only three weeks, however, and was not renewed. Shortly after the CDC moratorium was issued in 
September 2020, a new state moratorium (EO 171) was released; this one was structured differently than the 
first and was focused on ratifying the CDC order, with minor additions. This order was a response to reports 
that the CDC order was being applied unevenly across courts; it was an attempt to create a process 
framework for more consistent application of the federal moratorium.7  
Like the CDC order, EO 171 does not prevent the initiation of an eviction, but it does require landlords who 
want to take eviction action to first provide tenants with the CDC tenant eligibility declaration; landlords 
 




must prove they did this by providing a signed affidavit to the court. If a landlord receives a completed 
declaration from their tenant, they must submit it to the courts within five days. If the landlord still believes 
the tenant doesn’t qualify for CDC protections despite the declaration, they may submit a written response 
explaining why. A court hearing will then decide whether the eviction action will proceed. These extra 
protections take some of the responsibility of tenant protections off of the tenants themselves.  
Table 2 shows North Carolina state eviction moratoria issued between March 2020 and March 2021. 
Table 2: N.C. Eviction Moratoria 





















Halts initiating eviction proceedings 
for nonpayment; prevents late fees 
and interest; establishes 6-month 
period after June 20 to make 
“reasonable payment arrangements” 
for rent arrears. 
May 30, 
2020 




Clarifies the protections of the CDC 
eviction moratorium. Adds that 
landlords must certify to the court 
that they’ve provided their tenant 
with the CDC Declaration form. 
Establishes court hearing for 














Further extends EO171 
January 27, 
2021 
Jan 31-Mar 31, 2021 
EO206 Governor 
Cooper 
Further extends EO171 
March 30, 
2021 
Mar 31-June 20, 2021 
 
Eviction in North Carolina 
Eviction laws vary by state. In North Carolina, an eviction is legally called a “summary ejectment”. A tenant 
can be evicted for not paying rent, for remaining in a rental unit after the lease has ended, for breaking the 
conditions of a lease (bringing in a pet or unauthorized tenant, for example), or for criminal activity. Non-
payment of rent is the most common. In cases of non-payment, a landlord is legally required to serve a 
tenant with a notice to pay rent and late fees within 10 days or else have their lease terminated and vacate.8 
If the tenant does not pay, the landlord can begin the eviction process. There are five main steps to an 
 
8 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 42-3 (2020). 
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eviction: (1) The landlord files a Complaint in Summary Ejectment, usually with a small claims court, to 
request the court order the tenant to leave. (2) The tenant is served with a court summons with the date and 
time of their hearing. (3) The eviction hearing takes place (4) The magistrate makes a judgement (5) The 
sheriff removes the tenant from the property and the landlord changes the locks. The tenant has ten days 
before this last step to make an appeal.  
The Carolina Tracker received data from the North Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts for all 
reported civil cases, including eviction, over the last five years. The court data reflects the first stage of the 
eviction process outlined above: the filing of the Complaint in Summary Ejectment, called an “eviction filing” 
in this section. A tenant with an eviction filed against them will not necessarily be forced to leave their home, 
but they will have to go to court. The filing will also appear in background checks, becoming a serious 
obstacle to the tenant obtaining future housing as many landlords will deny tenants with an eviction record.9 
For this reason, an eviction filing is treated as a serious barrier to affordable housing and a marker of housing 
instability. 
The court data shows a significant drop in eviction filings during COVID-19 compared to previous years. From 
March 2020 to the end of the year, there were 61,143 eviction filings across North Carolina. 10  In the same 
time period in 2019, there were 150,584 eviction filings. This is a 59% decrease. Figure 1 shows 2020 
statewide eviction filings by month, compared to 2019 numbers. A substantial drop in eviction filings 
happened in April 2020, when the CARES Act and the NC Chief Justice’s moratoria overlapped.  
 
 
Fig. 1: Eviction Filings in North Carolina during COVID-19 
 
Figure 1 also illustrated eviction moratoria events in relation to filings. Although the first state moratorium 
(EO 142) was active for the first three weeks in June, eviction filings increased that month. Looking at weekly 
numbers, filings did increase at the end of the month after the state moratorium expired on June 20; but this 
 
9 Ginger, K. (July 30, 2018). Eviction Filings Hurt Tenants, Even If They Win. Shelterforce. 
https://shelterforce.org/2018/07/30/eviction-filings-hurt-tenants-even-if-they-win/  
10 Department of City & Regional Planning (2020). Carolina Tracker: A Resource for Recovery. https://carolinatracker.unc.edu/, 
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trend of eviction filings increasing at the end of a month can be seen across all years of data and therefore 
can’t be attributed to the expiration of the order. Renters were left vulnerable during a critical policy gap 
between June 20, when the state moratorium expired, and September 4, when the federal moratorium 
began. There is a visible increase in eviction filings during this time. From August 2020 to September 2020, 
filings decreased 28% coinciding with the CDC moratorium. In the second month of the CDC moratorium, 
however, eviction filings only dropped 6%. Importantly, with the addition of state EO 171’s extra 
requirements for landlords in the beginning of November, eviction filings further dropped 37% after being 
stagnant for the two months of CDC-only protections. By December, filings were down to levels not seen 
since the beginning of the pandemic. This could be a strong indicator that an eviction moratorium that puts 
the onus on landlords to (1) inform their tenants of their rights and (2) disprove their tenants’ eligibility 
(rather than tenants being required to prove their eligibility) was an effective tool in preventing evictions. The 
fact that eviction filings fell so much after landlords were required to prove that they were following CDC 
guidelines may also suggest that many were not. 
The data suggests that eviction moratoria have helped prevent eviction, but the are other possible factors. 
Implications for a possible relationship to rental assistance programs is explored in the ERA section of this 
paper.  
Eviction Moratorium Best Practices 
The Eviction Lab at Princeton University, along with Columbia Law School Professor Emily Benfer, developed 
a policy scorecard to rate eviction prevention policies during COVID-19 on a state level. The scorecard takes 
five policy categories into account: (1) barring the initiation of evictions, (2) suspending or extending eviction 
court processes, (3) barring enforcement of an eviction order, (4) short-term supports for tenants, and (5) 
long-term tenancy preservation measures that protect renters after the pandemic.11 North Carolina is one of 
14 states that received a zero rating, due to its state eviction moratorium expiring and eviction filings 
continuing. 
Across all states, the five general stages of eviction are (1) landlord issuing an eviction notice or notice to 
vacate, (2) landlord filing, serving, or otherwise initiating a judicial eviction lawsuit, (3) a court hearing, (4) a 
court ruling, and (5) physical eviction of the tenant by the sheriff. The National Housing Law Project (NHLP) 
has designed a model eviction moratorium act for states and local jurisdictions which focuses on stopping 
eviction at all five stages, for any reason except criminal activity.12 Stopping just one phase does not protect 
tenants who have already passed that stage, and it does not protect tenants from any stage before it, 
either.13 For example, halting only court hearings will not halt the eviction being filed, and a backlog of filings 
will still result in evictions after the moratoriums are lifted. As another example, halting eviction filings 
without halting eviction notices means that tenants who receive a notice may voluntarily choose to leave 
their housing in order to avoid eventually going to court; therefore a moratorium that doesn’t halt even the 
first stage of eviction will be ineffective at keeping people in their homes. The CDC and North Carolina 
moratoria do not meet the standards of the NHLP model. Combined with widespread unawareness of the 
CDC moratorium due to a lack of landlord reporting requirements, many tenants may not realize that they 
 
11 Alexander, A. et. al. (2020). COVID-19 Housing Policy Scorecard. Princeton University. https://evictionlab.org/covid-policy-
scorecard/. 
12 Model Eviction Moratorium Act. (March 20, 2020). National Housing Law Project. https://www.nhlp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020.03.20-Model-Eviction-Moratorium-Act_FINAL.pdf  




have the right to remain in their homes. Because the Carolina Tracker data includes only court filings, it’s 
unknown how many North Carolina tenants left their homes before an eviction went to the filing stage. 
A Shelterforce report from March 2020 listed best practices for eviction moratoriums. Included in this was 
that moratoriums should stay in effect until after the pandemic is over, giving enough time for renters behind 
on payments to access other public benefits or create a payment plan. Payments plans are necessary to 
prevent mass evictions as soon as the moratoriums are lifted. The first North Carolina eviction moratorium 
(EO 142) did include a payment plan requirement, but this policy is not present in the current moratorium. 
The report also asserts that eviction moratoriums should not be limited to non-payment of rent. These 
limitations create ambiguity and allow landlords to work around the restrictions.14 All federal and North 
Carolina moratoria have been in explicit in allowing other evictions. A consequence of this has been landlords 
attempting to accuse tenants of criminal trespass for remaining in a unit without paying, so that they can 
qualify for an eviction for criminal activity; this had to be addressed in the most recent iteration of the CDC 
moratorium. Tenants who have reached the end of their lease during the pandemic are also not protected 
from displacement; landlords are under no obligation to renew, and will be especially unwilling to do so if the 
tenant cannot pay, or if the landlord has decided to cut their losses and sell. This turns eviction into a waiting 
game, and as COVID-19 passed its first anniversary, even tenants with an annual lease agreement have been 
put at risk. 
Takeaways 
The original three-week state moratorium prohibited any new late fees and interest charges, halted landlords 
from initiating eviction proceedings, and required landlords to offer a 6-month payment plan for rent arrears. 
None of those protections were included in EO 171, likely due to unpopularity with property owners. The 
best practices for tenant protections in eviction moratoria are not well-liked by landlords, and policymakers 
face pressure to strike a balance between preventing evictions and protecting the income of landlords. 
Overall, federal eviction moratoriums have not been robust enough. State and local jurisdictions have had to 
develop a patchwork of eviction moratoriums, with different requirements and varying levels of protections. 
Data on evictions in North Carolina suggests that these additional protections may be effective in further 
reduction of eviction. 
Emergency Rental Assistance 
Multiple federal strategies were put forth in the early months of the pandemic to give Americans a boost to 
their income in the face of job loss. Extra unemployment insurance benefits of $600/week were established 
in the CARES Act, but expired at the end of July 2020 (the American Rescue Plan re-established extra 
payments of $300/week from March 11 to September 6, 2021). Eligible Americans also received two stimulus 
payments in 2020 and one in 2021, for a total of $3,200 per eligible adult over twelve months of the 
pandemic. The US Census Household Pulse Survey found that of the households that received and spent their 
first stimulus check, 78% spent it on rent, mortgage, or utilities.15 Another form of direct subsidy was rental 
assistance, distributed at the federal, state, and local levels. This section gives an overview of how those 
funding mechanisms were used as eviction prevention. 
 
14 Ibid.  
15 Perez-Lopez, D. and Bee, C. (June 24, 2020). Majority Who Received Stimulus Payments Spending Most of It on Household 





The CARES Act established multiple funding sources to distribute aid to state, tribal, territory, and local 
governments in 2020. Although none of these funding sources required jurisdictions to spend this money on 
rental assistance, these funds became critical for funding new and existing state and local eviction prevention 
programs.  
Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) Administered by the Department of the Treasury, the CRF appropriated $150 
billion to states, tribal governments, and certain local governments to be used for “necessary expenditures 
incurred due to the public health emergency with respect to the Coronavirus Disease 2019” incurred 
between March 1 and December 30.16 This was later extended to December 31, 2021. 
CDBG-CV A new type of Community Development Block Grant, administered by HUD, made available $5 
billion to states, cities, counties, and other jurisdictions “to prevent, prepare for, and respond to 
coronavirus”. Funding is available for at least three years. 70% of these funds must be spend on activities that 
benefit low- and moderate-income people (up to 80% AMI). For emergency uses, including rental assistance, 
CDBG-CV guidelines allow up to six consecutive months of payments to individuals or families affected by 
COVID-19, and require these payments are made directly to the provider (i.e., the landlord).17 CDBG funds 
had not traditionally been used for rental assistance before the 2020. These funds require more reporting 
and administration than the CRF funds, and have a 20% cap od administrative costs. 
While CRF and CDBG-CV funds have different eligibility and usage requirements, many local jurisdictions 
including Orange County used them both to fund emergency rental assistance. Another important though 
less-used fund in the CARES Act was the Emergency Solutions Grant (ESG-CV), also administered by HUD, 
which allocated $3.96 billion to homelessness response. This grant usually focuses on helping people facing 
homelessness to get stable, permanent housing, but allowed rental assistance as eviction prevention. 
Another HUD program, the HOME grant, received funding as well. The HOME program is normally used to 
build or rehabilitate affordable housing, but is flexible enough for rental assistance. With both funds we see 
the leveraging of existing funding mechanisms to distribute assistance in an emergency. 
An August 2020 Urban Institute report identified the Emergency Solutions Grant (ESG) program and Housing 
Choice Vouchers as the best funding vehicles for utilizing existing federal rental assistance programs during 
the COVID-19 pandemic, based on program capacity and scalability, equity, flexibility, and ability to meet the 
needs of the lowest-income renters.18 After the March CARES Act, policymakers made ESG the centerpiece of 
further emergency rental assistance proposals. Multiple acts originating in the House and Senate in May and 
June 2020 proposed an allocation of $100 billion in rental assistance to ESG, to be spent over three years. 
These acts did not pass.19 
Instead, in January 2021 the Department of Treasury launched the $25 billion Emergency Rental Assistance 
Program (ERAP) for state and local governments, allocated by the Consolidated Appropriations Act. Eligible 
renters must have a household income at or below 80% AMI, must qualify for unemployment or have 
experienced a reduction in household income or other financial hardship related to COVID-19, and can 
 
16 CARES Act, H.R. 748, 116th Congress. (March 2020). https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/748/text  
17 CDBG-CV Notice FAQs (August 27, 2020). HUD. https://www.hud.gov/sites/dfiles/CPD/documents/CDBG-CV-Notice-FAQs-
OBGA-082720-TOC.pdf  





demonstrate a risk of homelessness or housing instability. Households at or below 50% AMI are prioritized. 
The March 2021 American Rescue Plan allocated an additional $21.6 billion in Emergency Rental Assistance. 
State 
North Carolina created the Housing Opportunities and Preventing Evictions (HOPE) program in October 2020 
to provide rent and utility assistance. This program, now closed, is administered by the N.C. Office of 
Resilience and Recovery (ORR) and is funded by federal CRF and CDBG-CV funds and follows those eligibility 
requirements.20 North Carolina directed $167 million to the fund, which opened on October 15, 2020. The 
HOPE program included a Landlord-Tenant agreement as a condition for receiving funds. This agreement 
contained eviction prevention policies stricter than those in the moratoria: landlords must agree not to evict 
tenants for non-payment for 60 to 90 days after the last HOPE payment they receive and must work with the 
tenant to develop a payment plan.21 The HOPE program closed to new applications on November 11, 2020; 
as of April 2021, the program is preparing to distribute the recent federal relief funds. 
Local 
A study by the NYU Furman Center, the National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC), and the Housing 
Initiative at Penn found that by mid-October 2020, there were 438 emergency rental assistance programs 
across the US: 68 at the state level and 370 at the local level, all either created or expanded to address 
COVID-19 housing instability. Local jurisdictions were quick on setting up these assistance programs: of those 
surveyed, 72% of programs were new, and the vast majority were launched by the end of July 2020. Local 
programs varied in how they used the federal funding described above. About 40% of programs used the 
HUD funds either alone or in combination with other sources. Another 40% used CRF funds without HUD 
funds, likely due to the looser program restrictions. 20% of local programs did not use any federal funding 
sources; these jurisdictions likely used existing local funds and/or charitable contributions.22 
The following section will examine one of these local funds more closely: the Orange County Emergency 
Housing Assistance fund.  
Part 2: The Orange County Emergency Housing Assistance Fund 
Overview 
The Orange County Emergency Housing Assistance (EHA) fund is administered by the county Housing and 
Community Development (HCD) department to provide financial assistance for the prevention of eviction and 
homelessness. In 2020 the EHA dispersed over $2,400,000 in financial assistance to about 1,500 households. 
The EHA fund covers rent (including rent arrears or back rent), mortgage and utility payments, security 
deposits, and application fees. 23  Other emergency housing-related expenses, like moving costs, can be 
approved on a case-by-case basis at the discretion of HCD staff. To qualify for assistance, a household must 
earn no more than 60% of AMI, must have an urgent need for housing assistance that is related to COVID-19, 
 
20 Emergency Rent and Utility Assistance Program Design and Implementation (February 22, 2021). Orange County Housing and 
Community Development. http://orangecountync.gov/DocumentCenter/View/14945/Emergency-Rent-and-Utility-Assistance-
Program-Design-and-Implementation  
21 Landlord and Tenant HOPE Program Agreement. (2020). HOPE. https://www.ncrealtors.org/wp-content/uploads/NC-
Landlord-and-Tenant-HOPE-Program-Agreement.pdf   
22 Housing Initiative at Penn; NLIHC; NYU Furman Center. (January 2021). COVID-19 Emergency Rental Assistance: Analysis of a 
National Survey of Programs. NLIHC. https://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/HIP_NLIHC_Furman_Brief_FINAL.pdf  




and must not have adequate savings or other resources to cover that need. After an applicant is approved, 
assistance is paid directly to their landlords. Approved tenants receive a promissory note which they can 
provide to their landlords. In some situations, approved referral agencies may pay the housing expense 
themselves as long as the applicant is eligible under EHA guidelines, then the agency may apply to the EHA 
for reimbursement. In mid-October 2020, OCHCD began also administering N.C. HOPE program funds to 
Orange County recipients. OCHCD disbursed $1.6 million in HOPE funds to 355 households from October 
through December 2020.24 
History of the Fund 
Orange County HCD created the EHA fund in the beginning of 2020, before the effects of COVID-19 hit North 
Carolina. Previous to the EHA, Orange County had the Risk Mitigation and Housing Displacement fund which 
was created in FY2017-18 by the Board of County Commissioners. It was allotted $75,000 yearly. This fund 
was made up of three parts: a risk mitigation fund for landlords, a displacement mitigation fund for disaster 
events, and a housing stabilization fund for tenant assistance. The latter, which would become the EHA, was 
allotted $26,250. 25 This fund was not heavily used; it assisted 26 households in 2019 and only provided one-
time assistance. In addition to this Orange County fund, the towns of Hillsborough, Carrboro, and Chapel Hill 
had their own parallel funds. The four funds had separate eligibility requirements and assistance caps, 
making for a confusing system26. At the beginning of 2020, these four funds were streamlined into the EHA 
under the recommendation of OCHCD, and County funding significantly increased. Around the same time, 
OCHCD started administering Coordinated Entry, the HUD program for assessment and resource triage for 
anyone experience homelessness or other housing crises. OCHCD used this opportunity to establish the 
“Housing Helpline”, a referral service for anyone in Orange County facing imminent eviction and/or 
homelessness. The Housing Helpline became a direct referral pipeline to the EHA. This streamline was very 
timely, as just months later it would be put to the test of administering emergency funds in a pandemic.  
The Orange County HCD department works with nearly 20 community partners who refer residents to the 
EHA fund, including schools, faith groups, refugee organizations, affordable housing organizations, 
community development corporations, domestic violence centers, and Black and Latino community 
empowerment organizations. They also partner with North Carolina Legal Aid so that residents referred to 
the EHA fund can also be referred to receive free help with an eviction case. These partnerships are critical to 
accessibility and efficiency of the program. 
Funding 
County appropriations from the general fund, as well as local Town funds, initially made up the bulk of 
funding for the EHA. After those were exhausted, the EHA fund relied on CARES Act funds.27 The Orange 
County Community Giving Fund also contributes to the EHA fund and has distributed about $11,000. 
Eviction in Orange County 
Eviction filings in Orange County were relatively low, compared to previous years and to other jurisdictions. 
Figure 2 shows how monthly filings in 2020 compared to the last five years. Filings dropped dramatically at 
the start of the pandemic, from 158 in March to just 8 in April. 
 
24 EHA and HOPE Reporting (2021). Orange County Housing and Community Development. 
25 Emergency Rent and Utility Assistance Program Design and Implementation. 
26 Sutton, E. and Brandt, E. (September 9, 2020). Personal Interview [virtual]. 




Figure 2: Decrease in Orange County 2020 filings compared to previous years 
 
North Carolina saw a 59% decrease in evictions during COVID-19 compared to the previous year. In Orange 
County, that decrease was 71%. The surrounding jurisdictions of Durham, Alamance, and Chatham counties 
saw a 53%, 63%, and 54% decrease, respectively. It’s possible that Orange County had more significant 
decreases in eviction filings due to the EHA fund.  
Figure 3 compares monthly eviction filings between North Carolina and Orange County. Orange County’s 
trends from April through December mirror those of the state as a whole, but the effect is subdued. There is 
still a visible curve that peaks at August, but while statewide August peaks reached nearly 75% of the annual 
high, Orange County’s August peak reached only 25% of its February high. This suggests that while Orange 
County was susceptible to the same forces of housing instability, it was mitigated. 
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Orange County vs. National Trends 
The Orange County EHA fund is unique in several ways. It is in the minority of national COVID-19 emergency 
rental assistance funds in that it existed before the pandemic. It also targeted lower-income residents; out of 
114 ERA programs surveyed, nearly half set an upper income limit at 80% AMI. Orange County’s cutoff was 
60% AMI; only 25% of programs had a cutoff of 60% AMI or lower.28 While the amount of assistance varied 
widely across programs, the median out of 81 ERA programs was $1,200 per month per household. Orange 
County did not administer payments on a monthly basis, but their average payment per household ranged 
from $1,200 to $1,800 each month. 
EHA Fund Best Practices 
The NYU-Penn-NLIC national survey measured program outcomes by comparing the number of applicants, 
number of households assisted, and funding spent. Under these metrics, the best-performing rental 
assistance programs were found to share these common practices: Experienced administrators, partnerships 
with local nonprofits, less landlord restrictions, income caps, flexibility/adaptability of the program to 
respond to shifting needs, and less application requirements (this refers not to the presence of tenant 
eligibility requirements, but rather the application process and documentation required). The Orange County 
EHA shares many of the these identified best practices. 
The National Housing Law Project (NHLP) created a list of best practices for emergency rental assistance 
programs in June 2020. 29 The Orange County EHA meets some of these: namely coordinating with local legal 
aid and tenants’ rights organizations, employment services, and others; and not having more eligibility 
restrictions than federal guidelines require. Other NHLP best practices that were not present in Orange 
County include: tailoring the amount and duration of assistance should be to individual need rather than a 
one-size-fits-all formula; implementing tenant-landlord repayment plans; and designing a transition plan for 
tenants once they stop receiving rental assistance. These practices are difficult to implement because they 
require more staffing and direct case management. Many local jurisdictions may find them unrealistic. 
Orange County HCD also created a list of eight best practices learned from a year of administering rental 
assistance.30 
1. Partner with your local homeless Continuum of Care 
2. Partner with local governments, nonprofits, and Public Housing Authority 
3. Think about racial equity and language access 
4. Use a low-barrier and trauma-informed approach 
5. Staff up and set up technology infrastructure 
6. Proactively engage landlords 
7. Prepare for program analysis 
8. Partner with your local Legal Aid 
Flexibility was also a critical practice for the success of the EHA fund. For example, as need increased in the 
early months of the pandemic, the EHA fund was changed from one-time assistance to up the three times.31 
Soon after that, this limit was canceled and replaced with an assistance cap; anyone could now apply any 
number of times until they hit that amount. This assistance cap has also changed multiple times, from $2,000 
 
28 Housing Initiative at Penn; NLIHC; NYU Furman Center 
29 Emergency Rental Assistance Principles and Recommendations. (June 9, 2020). National Housing Law Project. 
https://www.nhlp.org/wp-content/uploads/Emergency-Rental-Assistance-Recommendations.pdf  
30 Emergency Rent and Utility Assistance Program Design and Implementation 
31 Sutton, E. and Brandt, E. (July 14, 2020). Personal Interview [virtual]. 
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in March 2020 to $4,000 over summer and up to $6,500 in the fall. Being responsive in this way has been 
helpful to the program, although it can also make it difficult to track outcomes consistently as the fund 
changes.32 The EHA fund is also flexible in extenuating circumstances, and exceptions to the rules can apply 
based on staff discretion. The EHA fund also has flexibility built into it in that it works with residents who are 
ineligible for receiving further rental assistance (because they are already under a federal program like 
Section 8) to determine alternative non-duplicative housing costs that can be covered. The EHA staff are also 
flexible around proof of income. It would be unhelpful to expect an annual tax return, for example, to show 
proof of sudden income loss due to COVID-19-related unemployment. For that reason, staff use a 
combination of different documents to determine a household’s current income. These examples of program 
flexibility are greatly needed in novel emergency response programs like these. 
Equity 
Equity is an important component in rental assistance program evaluation. Programs can show improvement 
of a situation in terms of overall averages, while simultaneously deepening social inequities. Equity analysis 
can involve race, ethnicity, age, gender, income level, marital status, neighborhood, disability, sexual 
orientation, educational attainment, and citizenship status. According to the NHLP best practices, rental 
assistance must target extremely low-income families and communities of color. Over 75% of EHA funds in 
2020 went to residents earning less than 30% AMI (extremely low-income)33, due to effectiveness of the 
Housing Helpline funneling referrals. To improve accessibility, program documents were available in English, 
Spanish, Burmese, and Swahili. Orange County HCD conducted commissioned a racial equity impact 
assessment in Fall 2020. OCHCD also tracked race and ethnicity of recipients: residents receiving funds were 
28% Black, 24% Latinx, 2.6% Asian, 0.5% Native American, and 11% white. However, race/ethnicity data is 
missing for 32% of recipients. 
To better track equity outcomes, local programs like the EHA fund should collect more complete racial data. 
Orange County is also beginning to conduct a neighborhood analysis based on a new tool from the Urban 
Institute, which shows what census tracts should be prioritized for rental assistance based on a 
comprehensive list of vulnerability indicators.34 This tool should be used by state and local rental assistance 
administrators for the distribution of future funds to assess if there are at-risk areas in their jurisdiction that 
have not been reached. Finally, OCHCD was not able to consistently track non-approved applications, and 
also does not track how many people started the application process and stopped for other reasons besides 
eligibility.35 Being able to track this may be a helpful addition to equity monitoring and barriers to access. 
Landlord Relations 
In Orange County, rental assistance is paid directly to landlords. This practice is standard: out of 189 ERA 
programs surveyed nationwide, 98% required tenants to apply for assistance, even while 90% paid this 
assistance directly to the landlord. To pay a landlord directly, landlords must first agree to participate. This 
requires the program conditions to be attractive. Restrictions on landlords, while protecting tenants, can also 
diminish this attractiveness. Out of 152 programs nationwide, 98% placed at least one restriction on 
landlords, the most common being not to evict tenants; 56% had more than one requirement. Other 
restrictions included forgiveness of rent arrears, a commitment not to increase rent, and participation in a 
local rent registry. Orange County stands out in that they had no landlord restrictions. In the NYU-Penn-NHLIC 
 
32 Sutton, E. and Brandt, E. (September 9, 2020). Personal Interview [virtual]. 
33 Emergency Rent and Utility Assistance Program Design and Implementation. 
34 Where to Prioritize Emergency Rental Assistance to Keep Renters in Their Homes. (April 5, 2021). Urban Institute. 
https://www.urban.org/features/where-prioritize-emergency-rental-assistance-keep-renters-their-homes  
35 Sutton, E. and Brandt, E. (July 14, 2020). Personal Interview [virtual]. 
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study, a greater number of landlord restrictions was associated with a lower ratio of households served to 
households expected to be served. Some programs responded to landlord resistance by modifying landlord 
requirements, or, less commonly, by funneling money directly to tenants. The N.C. HOPE program, which 
placed tight restrictions on landlords, has struggled to get landlords to participate.36 The Orange County HCD 
met that resistance when administering HOPE funds locally, so much so that the EHA fund became a critical 
backstop.37 Originally, the HOPE program required that landlords who received funds had to agree not to 
evict tenants for the remainder of their lease. Due to outcry from landlord groups, this requirement was 
changed to no eviction for 60 days after receiving funds. This is an example of how a balance must be struck 
between tenant and landlord protections, and how ideas around eviction prevention may work in theory, but 
not practice. The protections of a program are irrelevant if the landlord refuses to work with it.  
Takeaways and The Future of the EHA Fund 
By the end of 2020, 56% of surveyed rental assistance programs had served fewer households than expected. 
From the beginning of the crisis, demand met or exceeded supply for most programs, and applications 
increased over time. The most common challenges reported by administrators of local emergency rental 
assistance, however, were incompleteness of recipient applications, staff capacity, funding timelines, 
landlord cooperation, and technology barriers. Lower-reported than each of these challenges was funding 
levels.38 This suggests that even though the total national amount of distributed ERA funds has fallen short of 
most estimates of COVID-19 needs, administrative barriers are the primary hurdle. 
In the beginning of the pandemic response, state programs were performing better than local ones (by 
measure of actual vs. expected households assisted). By the end of 2020, however, local programs were 
outperforming state ones. Even newly-formed local programs had caught up to pre-existing ones by the end 
of the year. The Orange County EHA fund has been so successful as a local fund that the OCHCD department 
has been asked to speak to Indianapolis, Orange County, CA, Boise, New Jersey, Florida, Asheville, Union 
County, NC and several other jurisdictions in North Carolina. Now that hundreds more local ERA programs 
have been formed nationwide, and have learned from their 2020 experiences, they are poised to be effective 
administrators of housing assistance both for the remained of the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond. Local 
jurisdictions would be wise to leverage these programs and create plans to adapt them as a permanent 
feature of housing departments. Combining these programs with the local homeless Continuum of Care, as in 
the case of Orange County, could be a promising opportunity. If the practice of using CDBG and ESG funds for 
rental assistance continues post-pandemic, these local programs would have the capacity and experience to 
administer them. Local jurisdiction could also explore the possibility of consolidating multiple similar funds, 
as was done in the case of the Orange County EHA with the result of increased efficiency. 
The N.C. HOPE program is one example of a state-level assistance program that has struggled to manage 
demand. HOPE received 42,000 applications in its early weeks of operation in October 2020, and closed in 
less than a month. The ORR had to hire 170 new people to process this demand, since they had not 
anticipated it. Although 37,000 households were approved to receive $140 million in funds, the money was 
slow to be delivered. Four months after tenants and landlords were provided with promissory notes for 
future payment, which also locked the landlords into a period of non-eviction, only about $60 million had 
 
36 Ochsner, N. (February 8, 2021). “More than $100 million sitting unspent in program meant to help pay rent, utility bills”. 
WBTV. https://www.wbtv.com/2021/02/08/more-than-million-sitting-unspent-program-meant-help-pay-rent-utility-bills/  
37 Sutton, E. and Brandt, E. (March 19, 2020). Personal Interview [virtual]. 
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actually been paid out.39,40 While promissory notes may prevent evictions in the short-term, the inability to 
deliver on funds can create mistrust and prevent landlords from participating in future programs. Landlords 
will also be more likely to evict tenants who reach the end of their lease agreements or the end of the 60-day 
HOPE eviction protection if they haven’t received the promised payouts from the state. 
The establishment of the federal ERA fund in 2021, from which North Carolina will receive an estimated $546 
million, created an opportunity for local rental assistance programs like the Orange County EHA to continue 
to deliver assistance to local residents. The State of North Carolina, however, has decided to prioritize using 
this money to create an improved state-level rental assistance program, and they will no longer be using local 
programs like Orange County to administer these funds. The NC General Assembly passed HB 196 in early 
March 2021, allegedly without consulting the NCORR and despite protest from advocacy groups like the NC 
Housing Coalition.41 This bill establishes a central statewide hotline that N.C. residents will call to apply for 
housing assistance and case management. It also places a 5% cap on administrative expenses, despite the 
mass hiring that was necessary for the HOME program.  
The state ORR will award funds directly to residents instead of using local jurisdictions as program 
administrators. The amount of funds awarded will be capped at different amounts for each of the 100 N.C. 
counties based on proportion of residents at or below 80% AMI. Allotting funds by income instead of by 
other indicators of housing instability (like rent burden and eviction numbers) means counties with low risk of 
eviction may be underutilizing allotted funds while other high-risk counties experience unmet demand. For 
Orange County residents, $7,600,000 has been put aside.42 For Durham County it’s $9,000,000, even though 
Durham County had six times the eviction filings of Orange County in 2020. 
This main concern of housing advocacy groups in North Carolina is that this bill will slow down the 
disbursement of rental assistance by funneling 100 separate county funds through one office.43 The COO of 
the NCORR has predicted it will be “chaos”. This change also goes against recent ERA guidance released by 
the US Department of Treasury, which states that “Grantees are encouraged to achieve administrative 
efficiency and fiduciary responsibility by collaborating with other grantees in joint administrative solutions to 
deploying ERA resources”, including non-profits and local governments.44 Furthermore, any landlord that was 
unwilling to work with HOPE, or had bad experiences with it, will likely not be convinced to utilize this new 
program, either. N.C. Governor Roy Cooper signed this bill into law on March 11, 2021 with a comment 
asking legislators to revisit some areas, “including changes necessary to deliver rental assistance”.45 As this 
time it’s unclear what those changes may be, and more monitoring will be important to determine if the 
rental assistance process will change. Importantly, all the lessons learned from local fund best practices 
during 2020, including those of the Orange County EHA, are negated when fund administration is taken away 
from the local level. 
 
39 Wilson, D. (February 25, 2021). “'A HOPE nightmare:' Thousands of North Carolinians approved for rental assistance still 
await money months later”. ABC 11. https://abc11.com/nc-hope-program-rent-utilities/10370401/ 
40 Application Period Closing for NC HOPE Rent and Utility Assistance Program. (November 10, 2020). NC DPS. 
https://www.ncdps.gov/news/press-releases/2020/11/10/application-period-closing-nc-hope-rent-and-utility-assistance  
41 Sessoms, B. (March 5, 2021). “General Assembly bill would slow federal rental assistance, state official says” The News & 
Observer. https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article249697408.html  
42 N.C. Sess. Law 2021-3. (March 11, 2021). https://www.ncleg.gov/Sessions/2021/Bills/House/PDF/H196v8.pdf  
43 Legislative Alert: HB 196 Passes. (March 4, 2021). North Carolina Housing Coalition. https://nchousing.org/legislative-alert-
hb-196-passes/  
44 Emergency Rental Assistance Frequently Asked Questions. (February 22, 2021). U.S. Department of the Treasury. 
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Part 3: Policy Implications and Recommendations 
What Works 
In the short term, eviction moratoria and emergency rental assistance seem to have been effective at 
preventing mass eviction during COVID-19 in 2020. By looking at North Carolina eviction filing data, there is a 
visible correlation between these protections and lowered eviction filing rates. In 2021, policymakers should 
focus on expanding and strengthening these programs. Specifically, eviction moratoria should include a 
requirement that landlords inform tenants of their rights under the moratorium. Emergency rental assistance 
has shown to be most effective when administered at a local level, without too stringent of requirements. 
Local jurisdictions have shown that they are effective at administering housing funds and that they can work 
extremely quickly to develop new programs and respond to needs for adjustment. These programs should 
continue to be funded, and monitoring of states that choose to defund these programs is necessary to assess 
if the expected negative outcomes occur. 
Program Evaluation 
Program evaluation is especially necessary for local programs to avoid being defunded. Ongoing evaluation is 
a useful tool to either prove that a program works and thereby advocate for its continuation and increased 
funding; or to show that a program is not reaching its target goals, to either adjust said program or focus 
resources elsewhere. Many program evaluation techniques have come out of COVID-19 housing policy, all 
with varying metrics. The NYU-Penn-NLIHC national survey used a formula of number of residents expected 
to be served to number of people actually served. Some programs simply look at total money spent. Orange 
County has added an analysis of local eviction data to further prove program effectiveness. Large housing 
advocacy groups like Eviction Lab, the Urban Institute, and NHLP have designed grading metrics and 
scorecards based on the inclusion of certain policy protections in to produce an ideal model eviction 
moratorium or rental assistance program. Recipient demographic data including race, gender, and income 
level is also critical, as is a spatial neighborhood analysis. 
Few studies have come out that evaluate the effectiveness of a COVID-19 housing program by talking to the 
recipients themselves. A reporting mechanism that can collect feedback from recipients, while potentially 
expensive and resource-consuming, can provide invaluable information. The perspectives of recipients can 
give detailed insight into whether the programs are best meeting the clients’ needs. Involving clients in 
program evaluation can produce qualitative data that is complementary to the quantitative success 
indicators in official program goals. A program evaluation may yield positive results when measuring 
outcomes against stated policy goals, but results may become more nuanced when a program’s processes 
and outcomes are measured against the needs and experiences of the recipients. For example, evaluating a 
program by how quickly it can distribute large amounts of money is not a measure of whether this money is 
being prioritized to those most in need, nor does it show that the money is effective in preventing eviction. 
Collecting detailed information about how a policy differently affects people based on individual 
circumstances can expose patterns or gaps in service that would be missed in quantitative generalizations. 
This practice of treating recipients of a program as active consumers of a product can also be empowering. 46 
Collecting recipient feedback is not the same as ongoing case management. For example, it could look like 
contacting recipients of an EHA fund to find out if they have or have not been evicted since receiving rental 
assistance. This follow-up information could be invaluable to identifying weaknesses or oversights in an 
 
46 Teater, B. (2011). A Qualitative Evaluation of the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program The Recipients’ Perspectives. 
Qualitative Social Work. 10. 503-519. 10.1177/1473325010371242. 
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eviction prevention policy. This evaluation method has challenges: interviews can only target a small number 
of people, and they require transcription and coding by trained staff; surveys can reach more people but may 
have a low response rate, and produce a large volume of data to be processed. These challenges may be 
mitigated by utilizing volunteers and non-profit partners and utilizing technology like text banking or phone 
apps in developing a feedback mechanism. The point of policy evaluation is to determine whether a policy 
should be prolonged and to identify its weaknesses so they can be corrected.47 Local jurisdictions, being 
closer to the community, are poised to implement imaginative evaluation mechanisms, which is another 
reason that eviction prevention programs at these levels should be funded. 
Preparing for the Moratoria to Expire 
This is the first time in US history that national eviction moratoria have been instituted. The CDC moratorium 
was unprecedented both by inserting federal oversight into landlord-tenant law (the is usually under the 
jurisdiction of state and local governments) and by using a public health authority to do so.48 The eviction 
moratoria during COVID-19 were initially framed as primarily a public health policy to prevent the spread of 
the virus; the CDC stated that “In the context of a pandemic, eviction moratoria—like quarantine, isolation, 
and social distancing—can be an effective public health measure utilized to prevent the spread of 
communicable disease.”49 It’s become clear, though, that these moratoria are about more than public health. 
Previous economic downturns like the Great Recession saw a 10.6% unemployment rate high50 with millions 
evicted without a moratorium to protect them. Low-income households are more susceptible to income loss 
during economic downturns.51 As we look to the future and prepare for more economic depressions, 
whether or not they’re caused by a pandemic, the eviction moratorium may become a useful policy tool. 
Federal and state policymakers should consider how the lessons learned from COVID-19 could be translated 
to mass eviction prevention policies in the future.  
One critical investigation to improving eviction moratoria as a policy tool is figuring out how to prepare for 
their expiration. When the moratoria expire, millions of renters will be at risk of eviction and subsequent 
homelessness. It’s been estimated that between 12.6-17.3 million households (or 29-40 million people) were 
at risk of eviction as of August 2020, and this number has grown.52 As time goes on and landlords lose more 
of their income, even a short gap between moratoria could result in a national eviction disaster. Payment 
plans are not a panacea: renters who are still unemployed or still receiving the same amount of government 
financial support will not be able to afford higher monthly expenses from a payment plan. Furthermore, new 
stimulus packages continue to require proof of a COVID-19-related impact as a condition of rental assistance. 
We will likely see the effects of COVID-19 rippling for years, but as time goes on, the direct economic impacts 
of the pandemic may become harder to document. The first households to be excluded because of this may 
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be those households whose housing needs also existed before the pandemic; these are also the households 
that need the most help.  
One proposed solution to transition out of eviction moratoria is increased landlord engagement. There have 
been little to no direct mortgage relief policies for landlords during the pandemic. Yet virtually all COVID-19 
rental assistance funds pay directly to landlords. Emergency rental assistance has functioned not just as an 
eviction prevention technique, but as landlord economic protection. This is in line with federal bailouts paid 
to banks and other investors who experience losses during economic downturn. If rental assistance is a 
federal bailout program to protect landlords’ private property investments, it could be more efficient to 
reframe the program as that and to pay landlords directly. It takes more time, staffing, and effort for 
nonprofits and local agencies to run a public awareness campaign to inform tenants of the existence of a 
rental assistance program, and to process applications and questions, than it would for landlords to apply for 
themselves. As investors and business owners (many own an LLC), landlords are already experienced in 
processes like these and have greater access to information through state and regional landlord associations. 
By reorganizing rental assistance in this way, the responsibility would not fall to at-risk tenants – many of 
whom are experiencing immense stress and daily life pressures – to apply for payment on behalf of their 
landlords. This removes the expectation of saving the private rental market off of the individual tenants. 
Landlords may be less likely to evict tenants if they feel they have more control over the process of receiving 
rental assistance payments. 
Several housing policy stakeholders have proposed a federal program to support lending to landlords. Using 
Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act – which was used in the CARES Act to support the Paycheck 
Protection Program (PPP) loans, and also was used during the Great Recession – rental housing owners would 
have their monthly debt service reduced or would receive a forgivable loan, with the Department of Treasury 
as guarantor. The National Council of State Housing Finance Agencies has proposed a zero-interest loan for 
debt payments, with the caveat that building owners muse agree not to evict any tenant with COVID-19 
related job loss, must reduce rent maybes, and must forgive late payments.53  
There are several barriers to this policy proposal: as discussed earlier, restrictions on landlords make them 
less willing to participate in programs like these. Furthermore, this program would not help landlords who 
don’t have a mortgage (landlords whose buildings are already paid off). Smaller rental buildings are only 50% 
as likely to have outstanding mortgage debt, and are likely to be owned by small landlords. Therefore these 
landlords wouldn’t qualify, even as they are the ones most likely to need financial assistance as their primary 
income. Since nearly half of rental units are owned by individual investors rather than investment groups, any 
landlord relief policy would need to ensure small landlords are included.54 Otherwise, this policy runs the risk 
of a mismatch between who it benefits and who requires help (this was seen with PPP loans in 2020). Still, 
the proposed debt relief policy is a new policy that shifts the framework of rental assistance, and new ideas 









Housing Instability is Not New 
COVID-19 has brought renewed attention to it, but housing instability existed before COVID-19 and has been 
growing steadily for years. Data from 2019 show half of all renters cost-burdened, over two million eviction 
filings per year55, and over 560,000 people experiencing homelessness on a given night.56 A December 2019 
study by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities found that while 5.3 million households received federal 
rental assistance of some type, 15.8 million households are in need but unassisted (or, 75% of households in 
need of assistance do not receive any). The number of assisted families has remained largely unchanged since 
the early 2000s despite growing need.57 According to the Census Bureau’s 2019 American Housing Survey, 
the are 44,660,000 renter households in the US, making up 36% of occupied housing stock. The median 
income for renter households was $40,000; about half of renters spend more than 30% of their income on 
rent, and about a quarter spend more than 50%.58 The pressure building now is not just the missed rental 
payments and postponed eviction hearings that have been piling up since March 2020; it is the culmination 
of decades of neglect of affordable housing production and preservation, shown by rising number of renter 
households, rising rent prices, rising homelessness, rising rent burdens, and a decline in naturally-occurring 
affordable housing. 
COVID-19 policies have shown that rental assistance is effective. Housing Choice Vouchers are the largest 
federal direct rental assistance program in the US, and should receive more federal funding. Research shows 
that rental assistance reduces crowding, housing instability, and homelessness; reduces poverty; improves 
outcomes for children; and improves mental well-being and other health outcomes, reducing health costs. 
Currently, federal laws require a Public Housing Agency to provide 75% of housing choice vouchers to 
applicants at or below 30% AMI. An expansion of this subsidy program could allow a wider range of low-
income households to receive assistance. Between 7.8 and 8.2 million low-income households qualify for the 
Housing Choice Voucher; funding all of them would cost $100 billion/year.59 
However, vouchers have their weaknesses. The program excludes undocumented people, it cannot be 
applied to rent arrears, and millions are already on waitlists to receive this assistance. Landlords are also 
increasingly unwilling to work with the voucher program. Though the number of landlords in the US rose 
between 2009 and 2015, the number of unique landlord records associated with the voucher program 
declined by 10%.60  
The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program constitutes for the largest share of subsidized housing 
stock in the US and is “the most important resource for creating affordable housing in the United States 
today”, according to HUD61. And yet, although LIHTC properties are largely tailored to residents at 50-60% 
AMI, a lack of other affordable housing tools has increasingly pushed very low-income and extremely low-
income renters into LIHTC properties; the result is that VLI and ELI tenants in LIHTC properties are often cost-
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burdened.62 Furthermore, 2020 was the first year that LIHTC properties across the country reached the end 
of their 30-year affordability restrictions. This means that the stability of even the country’s largest affordable 
housing program is fragile. 
The primary housing programs in the US are reactive policies, waiting until people are in crisis to then extend 
just enough funding to get by on, without providing a long-term solution to housing instability or poverty. A 
commonly proposed proactive affordable housing policy is making housing assistance an entitlement benefit. 
This means that anyone who qualifies for housing assistance would receive it, similar to Social Security 
benefits, Medicare/Medicaid, and veterans benefits. However, even proactive housing subsidies are not 
enough to prevent housing instability. In 2020, the combination of state and federal unemployment 
insurance (with the extra $600 COVID-19 supplement) filled 80% of the income gap needed to return the 
rent-to-income ratio of recently unemployed renters to their pre-pandemic levels63. But, this insurance only 
went to people who were employed before the pandemic, meaning it went to higher-income renter 
households and left out those who had struggled with unemployment for a longer time. In general, half of 
unemployment assistance goes to renter households earning above the AMI.64  
A UC Berkeley Terner Center study of 9,800 LIHTC-subsidized renter households in the California Bay Area 
studied the effects of the Great Recession on renter income. For renters earning less than $40,000 a year, 
income growth was flat even years after the recovery; their higher-earning counterparts, however, saw large 
increases in their yearly earnings over the same time period. This shows that even living in subsidized housing 
is not enough to lift very low-income renters into a better financial position, meaning that they remain 
vulnerable to eviction even with rental assistance. And even within assistance programs, those with the most 
need are not adequately served. Our housing assistance programs alone are not substantial for providing 
opportunities for the long-term housing solutions that would come with an increased household income, 
such as home ownership. Progressive social policies like substantial minimum wage increases, worker 
protections, universal healthcare, childcare, and higher education, funded by a progressive tax system, are 
also pieces of the puzzle; especially as income inequality continues to increase. 
Finally, COVID-19 has illustrated how vulnerable and unstable our private rental housing system is. Because 
rental housing is dependent on private landlords, COVID-19 policies had to split their focus between 
preventing homelessness among low-income people and protecting the investment income of landlords. This 
is a massive strain on resources. The federal money funneled to private landlords could be better spent 
funding new public/social housing, housing collectives, or other forms of affordable housing that are more 
permanent and provide stable long-term housing. A more solid publicly- or collectively-owned housing supply 
would be more durable through an economic disaster. For this reason, the federal government should take a 
more proactive direct role as a housing provider. 
Conclusion 
Local and state jurisdictions have been impressive at getting new programs off the ground in the face of an 
unprecedented housing crisis. Local rental assistance programs should continue to be funded even after 
COVID-19. The applicability of eviction moratoria as a more permanent eviction prevention tool should be 
examined. At the same time, these two strategies can only go so far; mass reform of an unstable housing 
system is needed, and this time provides an opportunity. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought renewed 
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attention to the issue of housing instability in the US. Housing is often overlooked, but topics like eviction and 
the private rental market have been spotlighted to a larger public. The pandemic has seen unprecedented 
amounts of federal rental assistance and has inspired new policy solutions. This moment allows researchers, 
advocacy groups, housing planners, and policymakers to take advantage of increased funding and policy 
attention to roll out new housing solutions. The pressures and instability faced by low-income renters have 
now been felt by renters of a range of income groups, bringing more visibility to the deep issues of both the 
affordable housing system and the private rental market in the US. It’s imperative that policy solutions 
inspired by this last year do not leave the lowest-income renters behind. 
Further Research 
Although research on eviction has been increasing, there is still no national data collection of eviction 
numbers; states and local jurisdictions don’t monitor this data, either. It’s been up to research and policy 
institutes like the Eviction Lab at Princeton and the Anti-Eviction Mapping Project to collect this data, which is 
usually from eviction court filings. No national database of landlords exists, either. Housing data in general is 
not centralized, and research and data gaps that existed before the pandemic have made it difficult to study 
trends in COVID-19. There is a need for national databases administered by HUD. HUD must strengthen its 
research, data tracking, and evaluation efforts. For example, the Eviction Crisis Act of 2019, introduced in the 
Senate, proposed that HUD must establish and maintain a national eviction database.65 
COVID-19 has brought about large amounts of research around housing, much of which is ongoing. An 
opportunity for research is in analyzing how emergency solutions could become permanent, such as the 
housing of people experience homelessness in hotels to prevent overcrowding in shelters. If research shows 
that policies like this were effective during the pandemic, there can be advocacy to make them permanent. 
Research around COVID-19 can also impact the study of post-disaster management, including housing.  
During a natural disaster, displacement may be dealt with by providing temporary alternative housing in 
stadiums, churches, and other mass shelters. When people are displaced during a pandemic, however, 
shelter is more difficult. 2020 saw 22 separate billion-dollar weather and climate disasters in the United 
States: namely Hurricane Laura in Louisiana in August; the Midwest Derecho in August; and the Western 
wildfires from August to December.66 The Texas power crisis in February 2021 was another mass-
displacement event. These disasters presented immense challenges for how to handle displaced populations 
while keeping them socially distanced. Research into lessons learned from natural disasters during COVID-19 
could inform hazard planning in this way. 
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